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Even though some form of railway regulation already existed in the 
United States, starting with the Interstate Commission the US Congress 
established in 1887, economic railway regulation is basically a European 
creation of the past 20 years. Such economic regulation became necessary 
as a result of the European Commission’s decision in the early 1990s to 
de- regulate and (in parallel) to re- regulate the European railway sector. 
Rail de- regulation and re- regulation are part of a broader initiative of 
the European Commission’s aim for a single European market, also in 
infrastructure (Finger, 2011; Finger and Laperrouza, 2011). The main 
reasons that are generally given for railway de- regulation pertain to the 
poor performance of the European rail sector and its loss of modal share 
vis- à- vis the road (cars and trucks) (Nash, 2013). The key features of 
European railway de- regulation, which have already been addressed else-
where (Laperrouza, 2011), are (1) the separation (to a certain extent) of the 
rail infrastructure from transport companies using this very infrastructure; 
(2) competition among the transport companies on this infrastructure 
(called competition for markets in open access such as freight since 2007, 
or competition for the market for regional or national services franchised 
through public service obligation contracts); (3) technical standardisation, 
which makes this type of competition possible due to low technical entry 
barriers; and (4) regulation and sector- specific railway regulators, which 
are generally regarded as being crucial to making such a partially liberal-
ized European railway market happen. As such, these key features follow 
the European Commission’s ‘general toolkit’ for creating single European 
markets in the different infrastructures.
This chapter focuses on the specific role that regulation and regulators 
play – and are supposed to play – in the shaping of the European railway 
sector (past) or industry (future). We do this by considering the economic 
dimensions of railway de- and re- regulation, as opposed to the technical 
and safety dimensions, which are dealt with elsewhere in this volume (see 
Chapter 12). This is also because railway regulation, at least in the way it 
was originally conceived, is basically supposed to be economic regulation; 
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however, as we will see at the end of this chapter, the boundaries between 
economic, social and technical railway regulation are becoming increas-
ingly blurred as railway de- regulation and re- regulation unfold.
This chapter is divided into three distinct sections. The first section 
presents the European Commission’s (EC) history and programme of 
railway de- regulation and re- regulation, especially with regard to economic 
regulation. In the second section, we look at the underlying railway eco-
nomics from the perspective of the main three types of rail market players 
that have emerged as a result of the EC’s de- /re- regulation initiatives; 
namely, infrastructure managers, train operating companies and station 
managers. The third section discusses the challenges for railway regula-
tion, and European railway regulatory policy more generally, that result 
from the newly emerging and increasingly fragmented European railway 
industry structure.
1.1  RAILWAy DE- REGULATION AND 
RE- REGULATION, EUROPEAN- STyLE
Prior to the initiatives of the EC to de- regulate rail, two member States – 
Sweden and the UK – had already made significant progress in this regard. 
Sweden was actually the first country to reform its railway market and 
probably has the most liberalized railway industry in Europe today. In 
fact, the first step, which is Sweden’s separation of the state railways into 
infrastructure managers and railway operators, dates back to 1988. As 
of October 2010, services were offered on open access grounds, even if  
they overlapped with services funded under PSOs (for a complete over-
view, see Finger and Rosa, 2012). In his doctoral thesis, Alexandersson 
(2010) argued that the Swedish reform was actually more ‘accidental’ than 
deliberate, and that the railways are a fortunate outcome rather than a 
deliberate policy. Similarly, the case of the UK is not an example of rail 
de- regulation either. Rather, it is a systematic exercise – thanks to the 1993 
Railway Act – of fragmentation (into approximately 100 different compa-
nies) and privatization with the parallel creation of a strong regulator (the 
Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR)) to make this fragmented system work 
(yvrande- Billon and Ménard, 2005).
In this sense, the efforts of the EC constitute the first systematic ini-
tiative, at least on a European scale, to create a single European railway 
market; or, as it became called in 2001, the Single European Railway Area. 
There is general agreement that railway de- regulation in Europe started in 
1991 with Directive 91/440/EEC. This is a rather programmatic directive 
that must be placed into the context of a series of White Papers. Directive 
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91/440 defined the main dimensions of European rail liberalization that 
have not changed since. It is ‘the most important Community measure to 
improve the competitiveness of rail’ (EC/COM (1998) 202, p. 2) and con-
sists of four axes, namely: (1) the ‘autonomization’ of railways from the 
State, both in financial and managerial terms; (2) the separation of trans-
port services and infrastructure management, at least at the accounting 
level; (3) the obligation of member states ‘to reduce railway debt to a level 
that does not impede sound financial management’; and (4) the ‘establish-
ment of access rights to railway infrastructure for railway undertakings 
established in the European Community.’ Directive 91/440 was followed 
by a 1996 White Paper entitled ‘A strategy for revitalizing the Community’s 
railways’ (EC/COM (1996) 421). Later White Papers were made broader 
and pertained to transport more generally; in particular, the 2001 White 
Paper on ‘European transport policy for 2010: time to decide’ (EC/COM 
(2001) 370) and the 2011 White Paper entitled ‘Roadmap to a single trans-
port area’ (EC/COM (2011) 144).
The second step towards the liberalization of the European railway 
sector was taken in 2001 in the form of several directives. The European 
Commission itself  sometimes refers to this step as the first Railway 
Package, and sometimes as the second. We will refer to it as the 1st Railway 
Package, as Directive 91/440 currently seems to be the accepted terminol-
ogy. Directive 2001/12/EC amends Directive 91/440/EEC (the 1st Package) 
and defines the access rights for international freight services between 
railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, thereby setting the 
stage for the liberalization of freight (to be effective in 2007). This directive 
also mandates accounting separation for passengers and freight opera-
tions, as it mandates the separation of transport operations from capacity 
allocation, and defines infrastructure charging and licensing. Directive 
2001/13/EC defines the licensing regime of railway undertakings and 
Directive 2001/14/EC sets forth the conditions for allocating railway infra-
structure capacity, charges for the use of railway infrastructure, and safety 
certification. Directive 2001/16/EC addresses Technical Specifications for 
Interoperability (TSIs), a condition for fair competition to take place. 
Most importantly in the context of this chapter, this 1st Railway Package 
mandates the creation of regulatory bodies, so- called National (Railway) 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), in every member state. Their task is to 
ensure fair and non- discriminatory access to the rail network and serv-
ices. The legal basis for their creation and their initial competencies are 
defined in Article 10.7 of Directive 2001/12/EC and in Articles 30 and 31 
of Directive 2001/14/EC.
Based on the 2001 Transport White Paper (EC/COM (2001) 370), the 
European Commission launched a so- called 2nd Railway Package in 2003, 
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which was subsequently adopted in 2004. The package consists of three 
directives and a regulation (Directives 2004/49- 50- 51/EC; Regulation (EC) 
881/2004), pertaining mainly to matters of safety and interoperability on 
both the conventional and high- speed rail systems. Directive 2004/49/EC 
is especially relevant for the different national regulatory authorities, as it 
amends Directive 2001/14/EC in matters of railway infrastructure  capacity 
allocation as well as in matters of infrastructure charging, thereby extend-
ing their remit and their powers somewhat. However, when it comes to 
the development of European railway regulation, this second package 
marks a milestone in that it creates – by way of Regulation 881/2004 – the 
European Railway Agency as technical and safety regulator (as opposed 
to economic regulation by which the NRAs are tasked). Indeed, the 2nd 
Package mainly identifies incompatible technical and safety regulations as 
an impediment to the creation of a single European railway area (ERA), 
and its mandate is to align technical regulations and harmonize safety 
standards.
The 3rd Railway Package (2007) is also grounded in the 2001 Transport 
White Paper and builds on the 2nd Package. It is generally said to consist 
of two directives (2007/58- 59/EC) and two regulations (1370/2007 and 
1371/2007). Its main hallmark is the opening up of the international 
passenger services market, including ‘cabotage’ (that is, the right to take 
on and offload passengers on the domestic portions of the international 
journey), as of 2010. Other important features of this 3rd Package are the 
introduction of rail passenger rights and the harmonization of licenses 
for train drivers. In terms of regulation, the latter is relevant for ERA, 
which, as part of its technical harmonization mandate, is now charged 
with train drivers’ licensing. Directive 2007/58 is relevant for the national 
regulatory authorities, as it extends open access – and therefore the remit 
of the NRAs – to international passenger trains and national passenger 
cabotage, which can actually be restricted if  it endangers the so- called PSO 
(Public Services Obligation) equilibrium. Regulation 1371/2007 on passen-
gers’ rights does not specify which will be the responsible regulatory body. 
Member states are simply tasked with setting up enforcement bodies that 
are independent (from the TOCs) at a national level, which may or may 
not be the NRA. The most interesting regulation is Regulation 1370/2007, 
also called the Public Services Obligation or PSO Regulation. Building 
on both the 2001 Transport White Paper and the 2004 White Paper on 
Services of General Economic Interest (COM(2004)374), Regulation 1370 
regulates national passenger transport that is in the general economic 
interest and cannot be operated on a commercial basis, including buses 
and trains. Its main feature is the introduction of tendering procedures 
for such PSO contracts no later than 2019. However, it is not the NRAs 
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that are charged with such tendering. Instead, member states must set up 
so- called ‘Competent Authorities’, which can either be national or regional 
(sub- national), to fulfill this task.
In 2012 the European Commission launched an exercise of simplifica-
tion and consolidation, called The Recast of  the 1st Railway Package by 
which the various existing directives and subsequent amendments were 
combined into a single document that also took into account observed 
shortcomings as result of industry evolution (2012/34/EU). In the eyes of 
the EC, the main shortcomings pertained to the lack of competition on 
the European rail network; inadequate regulatory oversight, mainly due 
to a lack of independence and powers of the NRAs; and the low levels of 
investment in the European rail infrastructure. The Recast is particularly 
relevant when it comes to economic regulation and regulators. On the 
competition side in particular, the Recast calls for more detailed network 
statements (annual documents that define the available infrastructure and 
the conditions of its use) and establishes more explicit rules about possible 
conflicts of interest and discriminatory practices, both of which must be 
supervised by the NRAs. In terms of investment, long- term infrastructure 
investment plans and better infrastructure charging rules are required, 
both of which will have to be supervised by the NRAs. Most importantly 
for our topic, the Recast aims to strengthen regulatory oversight, first by 
extending the remit of the NRAs not only to the above but also to ‘rail- 
related services’. Second, the powers of the regulators are to be consider-
ably strengthened with sanctioning mechanisms and investigative powers.
To the surprise of some, the European Commission proposed a 4th 
Railway Package only one year after the Recast. This package contains 
three main elements pertaining to railway governance: opening up the 
national passenger transport market, interoperability, and safety. At the 
time of publishing this chapter, the European Council has not yet adopted 
the 4th Railway Package. Whereas the interoperability and safety pillars 
of the Package, including the reorganization and strengthening of the 
role of ERA, are not controversial, the other two pillars are. It is still not 
entirely clear how the opening of the national passenger transport market 
will co- exist with the compulsory tendering of public service obligations. 
In any case, this last step of railway market opening will again extend the 
remit of the NRAs. However, it is in matters of railway governance – the 
most controversial part of the 4th Railway Package – where the powers of 
the NRAs will again be significantly increased. Indeed, the 4th Railway 
Package will now (in contradiction to EU rail regulatory policy since 
1991) allow for existing (holding) structures; that is, having infrastructure 
managers and train operating companies within the same firm. However, 
this comes at the price of strengthening the regulators tasked with also 
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overseeing the independence of decision making (between IMs and TOCs), 
the absence of cross- subsidies (from IMs to TOCs), the independence of 
the IT system, as well as the cooling- off  periods of staff  (when moving 
between IMs and TOCs).
As a result of these various legislative packages, the European railway 
sector has now been considerably restructured, with many member states 
unbundling their national monopolies and others creating holding com-
panies. As we will see in section 1.3 of this chapter, national regulatory 
authorities have been created in every member state that has a railway 
system. Overall, the railway sector has become more fragmented. Even 
more important is the fundamental shift that has been operating, basically 
in two areas – the funding and strategic behaviour of the involved actors – 
both of which pertain to the financial and economic fundamentals of the 
European railway sector:
●● As a result of European railway reform, government funding can 
no longer be relied upon to prop up a country’s railway industry. 
Funding must follow state aid rules and is closely structured by the 
various directives and regulations. National subsidies must be clearly 
earmarked and can only be used for the railway infrastructure as well 
as for PSO contracts. There is some leeway when it comes to access 
charges (a topic discussed in detail in Chapter 14 of this book). In 
this context, one must also mention that member states have been 
forced to tighten their fiscal budgets, mainly as a result of the eco-
nomic crisis.
●● Train operating companies and also even infrastructure managers 
are now forced to think commercially and thus strategically. For 
example, they can now generate returns on capital investments and 
the associated risks through new financing options. They can also 
obtain financing and risk guarantees for infrastructure construction 
projects, as they can be allocated a given passenger service for a guar-
anteed length of time (such as a PSO contract). They can also lobby 
for favourable track usage fees and receive advantageous tax treat-
ments for passenger and freight operations. Overall, however, there 
is no limitation to the strategic behaviour of the various operators, 
as we will see in the next section.
As a result of European railway reform, it is basically the relationship 
between the operators (infrastructure managers, TOCs) themselves, as 
well as between the operators and the governments that has changed. In 
between, regulators (so- called NRAs) have emerged, whose role is to bring 
some order to these various strategic relationships among the involved 
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actors to guarantee the continued functioning of the national railway 
system. But how does this hold up against the economic reality of the main 
industry players?
1.2  EUROPEAN RAILWAy INDUSTRy PLAyERS’ 
PERSPECTIVES
So far, we have seen how the EU has restructured the European railway 
sector by opening up the national railway infrastructures to train operat-
ing companies, first in the freight market (2007), then in the international 
passenger transport market (including cabotage; 2010), and now probably 
also in the national passenger transport market. This transformation is 
accompanied by major efforts in technical harmonization, particularly 
when it comes to interoperability. We have also seen that such restructuring 
is accompanied by both technical and economic regulation, which actually 
becomes a condition for this single European railway area to even func-
tion. Therefore, it is fair to say that the liberalized (to an extent) European 
railway industry is a highly regulated industry and will remain so for a long 
time.
In this section, we will now examine how the main three types of emerg-
ing European railway industry players – namely the railway infrastructure 
managers, the train operating companies (freight and passengers) and the 
railway station managers – are likely to behave in this de- regulated and 
re- regulated industry (Messulam, 2008). It is particularly important to 
understand their underlying economics (see Waters, 2007) and respective 
business models in order to assess, in section 1.3, the challenges to eco-
nomic railway regulation.
1.2.1 Railway Infrastructure Managers
Railway infrastructure managers are either the owners of railway infra-
structure or companies that have been awarded concession contracts. They 
are responsible for the safety and maintenance of railway installations, 
as well as for making any necessary renovation and capacity expansion 
investments. Most importantly, they are responsible for making their infra-
structures available to the different train operating companies. In all EU 
countries, infrastructure managers have been set up as national monopo-
lies, with most of them being publicly owned. There are, however, a few 
exceptions:
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●● Some German railway lines are managed by railway infrastruc-
ture managers that are independent of DB Netz, which is part of 
Deutsche Bahn holding.
●● Eurotunnel is both the infrastructure manager for the channel tunnel 
(opened to freight and passengers train companies) and the train 
operator for the Le Shuttle service.
●● The Perpignan- Figueras tunnel concession (between France and 
Spain) has been held since 2009 by TP Ferro, a private concession 
holder, which works as an infrastructure manager.
●● More recently, under France’s latest round of railway public- private 
partnerships (PPPs), Lisea (the company that won the PPP con-
tract for the LGV Sud Europe Atlantique high- speed rail line) will 
serve as the infrastructure manager and Eiffage Rail Express (the 
company that won the PPP contract for the LGV Bretagne Pays de 
Loire high- speed rail line) will perform infrastructure maintenance 
and renovation work, while France’s national railway infrastructure 
company, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), will manage the capacity 
allocation/access charge interfaces with the railway operators.
Regardless of their legal structures, railway infrastructure managers 
provide a critical service to any operator wishing to use their tracks. TOCs 
have no choice but to work with them, which puts infrastructure managers 
in a monopoly position. Consequently, the decisions of IMs have immedi-
ate and far- reaching effects on the business models – and even the survival – 
of the other industry players. Consequently, they are heavily regulated.
1.2.1.1 The infrastructure managers’ business model
The income for railway IMs comes from the sale of track slots to railway 
operators and from government funding earmarked for operations, new 
construction projects, capacity expansions and performance upgrades. 
The relative proportion of each – access charges and subsidies – varies 
by country. Basically, as explained in Chapter 14 of this book, the level 
of track access charges determines the level of subsidies. Occasionally, 
infrastructure managers are able to obtain government grants to offset 
financial losses, as is the case in France, or these can be subsidized for new 
 investments, as is the case in Germany.
Inversely, railway IMs’ expenses include operating costs (such as rail 
traffic controllers and control centres), maintenance, depreciation and 
renovation works (such as tracks, signalling systems, power systems and 
traffic flow software). Consequently, IMs must make major investments in 
extremely long- term projects, ranging from 30 years for a rail line to over a 
century for a bridge or a tunnel. This gives them responsibility for network 
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longevity, beyond temporary fluctuations in traffic. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that, at least in Europe, most of the rail infrastructures belong to 
the public sector, as private investors are unwilling or unable to take on the 
large- scale and long- range capital risk involved (as recent experience with 
Eurotunnel demonstrates only too well).
So how do railway infrastructure managers maximize income? A first 
source of income is the charges levied on the traffic. To recall, track access 
charges are generally set by national policy makers (along EU regulations) 
and, in rare cases, by the NRAs. Consequently, IMs are incentivized to 
lobby for increased track access fees, especially by charging higher fees on 
routes that have heavy traffic or are lucrative for rail operators, as is the 
case with high- speed train lines in France, for example. A second way to 
maximize income is to cut operating costs. For example, isolated mainte-
nance work can be merged into larger- scale contracts, while operations 
can be streamlined by consolidating control centres and using centralized, 
automated control systems. The payoff is higher workforce productivity, 
more efficient use of equipment and substantial reductions in expenditures 
that are relatively unaffected by the amount of traffic. In this context, one 
should also mention that IMs can quite easily delay maintenance works 
as well as infrastructure development, thereby cutting costs, at least in the 
short run. A third option involves building specific infrastructures that 
generate long- term income on lines that are highly profitable and can be 
expected to remain so. This is true of some high- speed lines in France, as 
well as the Betuwe Line in the Netherlands. A fourth and final way to max-
imize income is to discontinue line sections that have insufficient traffic or 
would require costly overhauls in order to continue operating.
Overall, and in order to ensure the economic balance of their entire 
network, railway infrastructure managers offset income and expenses 
between the various lines in the national network and between different 
types of traffic. In other words, they cross- subsidize between more and 
less profitable lines and different train operations. In France, for example, 
income from high- speed lines more than covers their total cost; in the case 
of freight, on the other hand, even the marginal costs of using the tracks 
exceed the income from freight access charges.
1.2.1.2 Implications for economic regulation of infrastructure managers
Infrastructure managers are monopolies and are therefore the most regu-
lated operators in the industry. Such regulation needs to take place in the 
following four areas: infrastructure pricing, network structure mainte-
nance and development, network access, and safety.
Infrastructure pricing is generally set by policy makers and/or regulators 
and has both micro- and macro- economic dimensions; in micro- economic 
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terms, regulation must provide a legal and economic framework for gener-
ating line accounts that approximate ‘actual cost’. Such a framework estab-
lishes a sound basis – shared with rail operators and the relevant transport 
organizing authorities – for addressing issues such as the long- term future 
and profitability of rail transport compared with other modes, particularly 
road transport. In macro- economic terms, regulation must be designed 
to give railway infrastructure managers the highest possible return on 
assets, while ensuring that value added is divided fairly between them and 
the railway operators. Likewise, income and expense offsets between geo-
graphic areas and types of trains should be calculated carefully, since this 
will directly affect how competition plays out among operators. Chapter 
14 of this book discusses the issue of regulated infrastructure pricing in 
detail.
Network structure issues are numerous and regulators (and sometimes 
policy makers) are involved in most of them. This is the case, for example, 
when IMs want to close down lines or sell them to other railway infra-
structure managers, as is the case in Germany and as is being considered in 
Scotland. Regulators are often also involved when it comes to developing 
and upgrading installations. In addition, regulators may set medium- and 
long- term priorities for expansions of capacity (by  requesting so- called 
network development plans) that do not necessarily match up with 
railway infrastructure managers’ short- or medium- term cash- flow needs. 
Managers may understandably be tempted to avoid specific investments 
in capacity and to focus instead on raising fees on the busiest rail lines. 
However, even this kind of regulation may not be sufficient to address 
the medium- range needs. At a time of sharply rising urban and suburban 
traffic and modal shift, it will be up to national (and European) trans-
port policies to plan for and finance the necessary infrastructures. In this 
respect, the UK has proven exemplary: after considerable trial and error, 
the UK’s Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) has now emerged as a well- 
informed arbiter and champion of a long- range outlook for Britain’s rail 
sector.
Moreover, the ORR is also an example in matters of regulating network 
access, as it has produced a document setting out the general conditions 
for network access and a structured, detailed, down- to- earth regulatory 
corpus governing contracts between the railway infrastructure managers 
and the rail operators, as well as the rules for competition among opera-
tors. Overall, however, network access is also a closely regulated area, in 
which infrastructure managers and train operators must sign so- called 
(long- term) framework agreements and infrastructure managers must 
publish annual network statements outlining the conditions for access to 
their infrastructures.
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Because they have oversight of signalling and other safety installations, 
and because they draw up the operating rules followed by all rail operators, 
railway infrastructure managers play a pivotal role in ensuring network 
safety. The decisions they make in this area have a major impact, often 
requiring railway operators to upgrade their equipment, adjust staffing 
and recast their training programmes. In addition, the new European 
Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSIs) introduced by the ERA, 
particularly ERTMS (the European Rail Traffic Management System) for 
signalling, highlights the need for railway infrastructure managers and 
railway operators to coordinate the timing and focus of their investments. 
Unilateral moves by a railway infrastructure manager are likely to saddle 
operators with high upgrading costs (for example, €500,000 to make an 
existing locomotive ERTMS- compatible, compared to the cost of a new 
locomotive of between €2.5 and €3 million); these costs cannot be passed 
on to end users in the short term. Thus, there is also a tendency to look at 
safety and interoperability regulation, which is traditionally the remit of 
ERA and the national safety regulators, from an economic (regulatory) 
point of view.
1.2.2 Railway Operators
In both freight and passenger transport, railway operators (also called train 
operating companies or TOCs) are the only actors in direct contact with 
customers, which means they play a pivotal role in the transport sector. 
Therefore, the prosperity of the rail sector depends, to a large extent, on 
their profitability, that is, their added value. How that value is divided up 
between the TOCs and the IMs in the form of access charges is the primary 
determining factor behind the industry’s health and overall economics. 
This means that it is just as essential to regulate relations between opera-
tors and the rest of the industry as it is to regulate competition among 
railway operators. In short, railway operators – rail transport companies – 
combine their own inputs (such as rolling stock, crews, sales networks, 
logistics facilities) with inputs purchased from other industry players (such 
as access to corridors, logistics facilities and passenger interchange hubs) 
to deliver a non- storable service whose value varies according to the day 
and the time of day.
1.2.2.1 The TOCs’ business model
Revenues are generated by the TOCs from two different sources: customers 
and subsidies. In the case of passenger transport, customers are high- speed 
train passengers (if  available), long- distance passengers and commuters. 
Subsidies can be quite substantial, but Regulation 1370/2007 (see above) 
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has forced them to take the form of PSO contracts; in other words, they 
are earmarked. In the case of freight, customers are generally chargers 
and subsidies hardly exist anymore. Railway operators are responsible for 
filling up trains and bear the risk of not succeeding. Their profit margins 
depend on how efficiently they combine the various inputs and how inten-
sively they make use of them, such as by minimizing idle periods for trains 
and crews. A number of these inputs are completely beyond their control 
(such as corridors and stations) and are available to them on the same 
terms as to their competitors. This may apply to a lesser degree to other 
inputs, such as rolling stock and train terminal facilities, but these are still 
inelastic and can weigh heavily on operators’ balance sheets.
This leaves five requirements for gaining competitive advantage: 
(1) railway operators need access to ‘good’ track slots (that is, slots that 
offer rapid service to popular destinations) and the ability to provide a 
level of service appropriate to solvent demand; (2) they must also obtain 
the most efficient rolling stock for the lowest possible price; (3) they must 
leverage their inputs effectively, achieving maximum workforce productiv-
ity and maximum use of rolling stock; (4) they must maximize income by 
filling up trains with dynamic pricing policies, including yield management 
on high- speed trains and attractive fees on container trains; (5) finally, they 
need government funding to maintain service on lines considered essential 
for public service reasons, which would otherwise be unprofitable.
Two key elements of the TOCs’ business model – track access charges 
and rolling stock – require particular attention here. Track access charges 
are regulated and will be discussed below. Rolling stock, on the other hand, 
is not regulated but must be addressed briefly here. To recall, rolling stock 
is generally a railway operator’s largest recurring expense item (20–30 per 
cent of its fixed costs). It is an extremely long- lived tangible asset (30–40 
years on average) with varying liquidity. This compels railway operators to 
manage the risk of a mismatch between such assets and market demand.
There are two main categories of rolling stock: vehicles providing 
motive power (for example, locomotives and self- propelled units) and 
unpowered cars. Because their technical specifications are dictated entirely 
by the infrastructure they operate on, such vehicles are hard to sell, replace 
or redeploy; this is unlike airplanes, trucks and cars, and even ships. For 
example, electrically powered locomotives cannot be redeployed on other 
lines with different voltage. Transforming them to different signalling 
systems can be expensive and take up several financial quarters. Loading 
gauges and platform heights vary from country to country and in some 
countries from region to region. Finally, special safety standards may 
apply to key infrastructure points (fire prevention in tunnels, for example). 
One possible solution is to transfer that risk by selling rolling stock to a 
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ROSCO, or rolling stock company, which then leases it back to the railway 
operator over a period for which the operator expects to have reasonable 
market visibility. However, the British experience highlights the limitations 
to this approach (see Chapter 9 in this book). Railway operators need high 
recurring profits to offset the risk of purchasing or operating their rolling 
stock, whether they own it or lease it from a ROSCO. Also, technical con-
figurations adopted by railway infrastructure managers (such as signalling 
systems, speed and acceleration rates calculated for a given route) are vital 
to railway operators, since they can render assets with substantial residual 
value obsolete virtually overnight, with no opportunities for selling them 
to other operators. Overall, this underscores the need for industry- wide 
regulation to protect railway operators against the risk that infrastructure 
configuration decisions made with no prior discussion will render their 
rolling stock obsolete.
For effective risk management of industrial assets, therefore, it is essen-
tial that rail operators are able to count on medium- term stability through 
a framework agreement defining their competitive environment. Unless 
this is in place, opening the market up to competition will not, on its own, 
be enough to attract new capital into the rail industry.
1.2.2.2 Regulation
TOCs are not directly regulated by the NRAs, but their relationships with 
infrastructure managers and station managers are. They are regulated by 
safety regulators and by ERA for their rolling stock, as well as for train 
drivers. TOCs may also be regulated by competition regulatory authorities. 
However, they are chiefly concerned with the regulated access to slots and 
even more so with the regulated track access charges. For example, track 
access charges can represent up to 25–30 per cent of the total costs for 
long- distance passenger- transport operators in some countries. Also, the 
method used to calculate prices has a decisive impact. For a track slot that 
is profitable regardless of its payload capacity, the rail operator will seek 
to maximize the number of passengers per train, even going so far as to 
purchase options that are more expensive but have higher capacity. Thus, 
a railway operator with greater capacity gains a relative advantage. By 
contrast, if  a track slot’s value is contingent on payload capacity, the train 
operator may be tempted to increase the number of trains while making 
each train smaller, thereby contributing to infrastructure saturation.
1.2.3 Train Station Managers
Train station managers are responsible for managing passenger stations, 
especially interchange stations or hubs for accessing urban and suburban 
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transit lines. They must ensure equal treatment of all railway operators 
and relay information to passengers as well as to people accompanying or 
waiting for them; in other words, there must be non- discriminatory access 
to all services they offer. Their status can vary from country to country and 
even from station to station. A station manager may be part of the railway 
infrastructure manager with responsibility for the rail infrastructure used 
by that station. It may also be part of a railway operator providing service 
to that station, as is the case in the UK, or a standalone business like 
DB Station in Germany or Grandi Stazzioni in Italy. Whatever the form 
of organization, managing stations is a capital- intensive business that is 
highly sensitive to (local) tax variations. In densely urbanized areas, such 
investments often prove costly, and the need to comply with strict zoning 
and other rules can make project completion a long, slow process. Such 
projects are closely related to those of the relevant railway infrastructure 
manager.
1.2.3.1 Business model
Train station managers earn income in the form of fees similar to airport 
landing fees. At the request of railway operators, they may also provide 
additional services at government- regulated fees, ranging from on- board 
catering and food logistics services to baggage handling and vending- 
machine management. A further possible source of income is the rental of 
space in stations to retailers. The main expenses of train station managers 
are cleaning, security, information and display systems, bus and under-
ground interconnection services, bicycle facilities and property tax.
1.2.3.2 A new field for regulation
The main area of regulation for station managers pertains to non- 
discriminatory access. Indeed, station managers must ensure equal treat-
ment for all railway operators to their infrastructures, such as information 
display, signage, connecting service management and many other services. 
A series of lawsuits brought by Arriva and Veolia/Connex against DB 
Station for distorting competition in favour of DB Fernverkehr and DB 
Regio serve as reminders of how sensitive these issues can be. Under the 
Recast (2012), many of these potentially discriminatory practices can be 
or are now regulated. However, many other practices require regulatory 
attention. For example, when a transit hub in an urban area expands, how 
can the added value be divided between the station manager, the railway 
infrastructure manager and even the railway operators that bring in most 
of the additional customers? The Japanese have dodged this touchy issue 
by getting industry players to form integrated conglomerates, as is the case 
for the Greater Tokyo Area mass transit system.
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1.2.4 Conclusion
Let us briefly crystalize how the main operators’ business models are 
affected by railway regulation. As we have seen, the business models of 
both the IMs and TOCs are heavily influenced by the level and mode of 
calculation of the track access charges. While track access charges are 
entirely regulated, they are not always set by the regulator but are generally 
rooted in regulatory policy decisions and are, in fact, as argued in Chapter 
14 of this book, an economic policy rather than a purely economic issue.
In addition, TOCs are strongly affected by the type of available slots on 
tracks and in stations. Access to slots and rail- related services is a typical 
regulatory issue, with NRAs in charge of preventing discrimination. But 
looking at access to slots simply in terms of (non- ) discrimination – which 
NRAs currently do – may actually miss the point. Indeed, both because 
train operations remain heavily subsidized (in the case of PSOs) and 
because of intermodal competition and related public policy objectives, 
looking at slots from a purely competitive perspective may, as we have 
argued in this section, produce negative welfare effects and either lead to 
higher subsidies than necessary and/or to undesirable modal shifts towards 
the road. In other words, even though slot allocation (and corresponding 
regulatory policy) must be done in a non- discriminatory way, it must also 
be embedded within larger public policy objectives.
The same can also be said of technical specifications and safety stand-
ards, which again affect the business models of all the TOCs. Even if  tech-
nical and safety standards must be applied in a non- discriminatory manner 
to all the TOCs, different TOCs will be affected differently, which can again 
lead to unanticipated and undesirable welfare consequences.
In this section, we have demonstrated that viable business models in 
the rail sector are not achievable (and therefore private capital flow would 
dry up) without addressing two main policy issues: first, it is important 
to define and then to monitor the fair application of rules for sharing the 
added value created by the rail industry as a whole among infrastructure 
managers, railway operators and train station managers. Failure to do so 
will not incentivize the involved actors to actually develop the rail sector 
and thereby contribute to modal shift. This issue is not currently being 
addressed, either by railway regulation or by railway regulatory policy 
(where it belongs). Second, it is important to ensure that each player’s role 
is economically viable, and hence the profitability of the sector as a whole 
is high enough to attract the capital necessary to develop the rail industry. 
A key aim here is to ensure a fair balance between natural monopolies 
and competing railway operators. This issue speaks, in particular, to 
the stability of the regulatory framework and especially to the role and 
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independence of the regulator, which must ultimately ensure such stability 
(for example, against short- term political intervention in terms of funding 
and investment).
In short, European- style railway de- regulation has created antagonistic 
interests between all the actors involved: infrastructure managers against 
train operating companies, train operating companies against each other, 
station managers against everybody else, etc. Regulators are there to arbi-
trate these different antagonistic interests, but only to the extent that they 
are legally empowered to do, as we will see in the next section.
1.3  EUROPEAN RAILWAy REGULATION AND 
REGULATORS
In this section, we will first briefly recall the evolution of European railway 
regulation (this was already done to a large extent in section 1.1) and then 
present the evolution of the European railway regulators. Before doing 
that, however, let us summarize the above in order to set the stage for the 
broad role of railway regulation and regulators.
1.3.1 Setting the Stage
In section 1.2 above, we outlined the business models of the three newly 
emerging actors in the European railway sector at a national level, as well 
as their implications for regulation and regulators. However, it is important 
at this point to introduce a distinction leading to two different situations 
and subsequent scenarios for regulators. The first situation is one where 
the national railway system is still somewhat integrated; that is, where 
the incumbent railway company still operates under a holding model. In 
Europe, this is particularly the case in Germany, France, Italy, Austria and 
Switzerland. In such cases, the railway regulator is basically in conflict with 
the incumbent and its main role is to support new entrants in case they feel 
discriminated against. The public policy objectives of the overall railway 
sector are either still more or less delegated to the incumbent or negotiated 
directly between the ministry (railway administration) and the incumbent. 
In this case, the regulator is actually more of a ‘nuisance’ to the overall 
functioning of the still somewhat integrated railway system.
The second situation is one in which the national railway sector has been 
unbundled; the UK is currently the most extreme case of railway frag-
mentation. Other member states are at various stages of this unbundling/
fragmentation process, with Sweden and Belgium probably being the most 
and least ‘advanced’, respectively. In this case, the railway regulator must 
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inevitably play a much more active role that goes far beyond discrimina-
tion, basically arbitrating the interests of the fragmented actors in the 
national railway sector to ensure the functioning of the national railway 
system. This not only leads to the regulator having a much more power-
ful role, but also a somewhat changed role. On the one hand, the regula-
tor now plays the role of an overall national ‘railway system manager’ 
(despite having no operational skills and attributes). On the other hand, 
and because the national railway system is primarily a public policy issue, 
the national railway regulator becomes a partner of the national policy 
makers or, worse, takes over some roles of policy making; this can already 
be observed in the UK case of the ORR.
In any case, the overall trend is clearly moving towards the second situ-
ation, mainly because the European Commission is pushing in this direc-
tion, as we will see in the following sub- section.
1.3.2 The Evolution of EU Railway Regulation
In section 1.1, we saw how the European railway regulatory framework 
has unfolded step by step; that is, from Directive 440/1991 to the three 
Railway Packages (2001, 2004 and 2007), to the Remit (2012), and now 
to the currently discussed Package No. 4. In the eyes of the European 
Commission, economic regulation of the European railway sector by way 
of  independent national regulatory authorities plays a central role in the 
creation of a Single European Railway Area. But regulatory policy is a 
two- fold policy issue. On the one hand, there is the substantive regulatory 
policy defining what regulation is about and what remit regulators have; 
on the other hand, there is the institutional regulatory policy defining the 
powers of the regulators.
In matters of substantive regulatory policy, the various EU direc-
tives and regulations have gradually extended the remit of the national 
regulatory authorities. From overseeing discrimination in freight (as of 
2007), this task has been extended to international passenger transport 
including cabotage (as of 2010) as well as to rail- related services (as of 
2012) and is planned to be extended to national passenger transport (as 
in the final adoption of the 4th Railway Package). In all these types of 
rail transport, the regulator must ensure that infrastructure (or station) 
users are not discriminated against in terms of slot attribution or in terms 
of access charging. In particular, the Recast (2012) defines additional 
functions, specifically when it comes to observing the so- called ‘economic 
equilibrium’ of PSO contracts, as well as in matters of overseeing frame-
work agreements and network statements. The 4th Railway Package will 
also further extend the regulators’ remit to control the so- called ‘Chinese 
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Walls’ of integrated railway undertakings, as well as to control tendering 
procedures. While these are the main tasks of a national railway regulator, 
there are several other, less clearly defined tasks, such as monitoring the 
railway market. Also, countries can attribute further tasks to their respec-
tive NRAs, as is notably the case with the UK and Germany. In Germany, 
for example, technical and safety regulations fall within the remit of the 
sector- specific regulator (Bundesnetzagentur), as do consumer complaints 
in the case of the UK.
National regulatory authorities were officially set up in 2001 by 
Directives 2001/12/EC (article 10.7) and 2001/14/EC (articles 30 and 31). 
Since then, national regulatory railway authorities have been set up in 
every single member state, as well as in Switzerland and Norway along 
the EU model (see Finger and Rosa, 2012; Finger, 2014). The European 
Commission has regularly expressed concerns about the independence, 
staffing and resources of these authorities, all of which still vary widely 
across the member states due to strong national path dependencies (see 
European Transport Regulation Observer, 2013). In the Recast (2012), the 
Commission paid particular attention to the regulators; while it acknowl-
edged some progress, it was mainly concerned about the regulators’ 
independence (which needed strengthening) and powers (which needed 
clarification), especially when it came to rail ex- officio interventions, sanc-
tions and information requests. In the 4th Railway Package, the European 
Commission has sought to further enhance the NRAs’ independence, 
powers and resources (Kaufmann, 2013).
In the Recast (2012), the European Commission is also particularly 
concerned about coordination and harmonization among the differ-
ent national regulators. However, collaboration among regulators dates 
back to 2010, when the regulatory bodies of the UK, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Switzerland and Germany launched a corresponding initiative, 
the so- called Independent Regulators’ Group – Rail (IRG- Rail). yet, 
with the Recast, the Commission launched its own European Network 
of Rail Regulatory Bodies (ENRRB), this time with the Commission as a 
member (and without Switzerland, which is not part of the EU) and with 
Commission support. Its purpose is to cooperate on market monitoring 
and investigation, especially on cross- border matters, such as the newly 
established freight corridors.
1.3.3 Conclusion
The clear trend from the above presentation is that that NRAs are con-
stantly extending their remits and powers and are actively supported in 
this endeavour by the European Commission. In addition, and since 2012, 
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the NRAs have also been encouraged and supported to work with the 
Commission, not only in order to align their ways of working, but also 
to become more aligned with the approach and goals of the Commission. 
Such strengthening of the NRAs, as well as their coordination by the 
ENRRB, is of course fully coherent with the various rail liberalization pol-
icies, as outlined in section 1.1 of this chapter. Indeed, a liberalized (that 
is, fragmented) rail sector, with the main actors now behaving strategically, 
if  not commercially, requires a strong regulatory framework and especially 
strong, well- coordinated and fully aligned (with the Commission) regula-
tors. This is, by the way, similar to other European network industries, such 
as electricity, air transport and telecommunications.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we will highlight three concerns that all somewhat relativ-
ize this otherwise well thought- through and coherent approach of the 
European Commission to rail de- regulation and re- regulation. These con-
siderations pertain to the systemic nature of railways, as well as to some 
of the economic fundamentals of rail, both in terms of patronage and 
intermodal competition.
Railways are systemic in nature and rail ultimately operates as an inte-
grated socio- technical system. While market elements can be introduced to 
make the overall system more efficient and perform better, there are some 
critical system- relevant functions – particularly interoperability, capacity 
management and overall system management (such as in the case of time-
tables) – that need to be performed so that the system as a whole can work 
(Crettenand and Finger, 2014). Historically, such critical system- relevant 
functions were performed by the historical vertically integrated railway 
operator. As this incumbent is unbundled, competition is being introduced 
and competing operators are emerging. These critical system- relevant 
functions then fall by the wayside, given that they are not commercially 
lucrative and cannot be attributed to one of the actors since all actors now 
behave strategically. Almost by default, the independent regulator emerges 
as the only actor that can take on these critical system- relevant functions, 
or at least the coordination and supervision of these functions (such as 
slot allocation). Time will tell whether the regulator can actually play this 
overall system- coordinating role or whether we are perhaps placing too 
much faith in the regulator and its abilities.
The second concern pertains to the economic observation and fact that 
the main rail business actually lies in mass transit. That is where most of the 
passengers are and where most of the money can potentially be generated. 
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This means that the relevant unit of a railway system is not the nation 
state, and even less so the European Union. This also leads to the fact that 
when operators start to behave commercially and strategically, they will 
automatically prioritize railway activities that are different to those pri-
oritized by their national governments and by the European Commission. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the objective of the creation of a 
Single European Railway Area can actually withstand the economic reality 
of the essential local rail business.
The third concern is equally economic in nature. It is obvious that the 
main competitors of a railway operator are not other railway operators, 
but rather cars, trucks, low- cost airlines and, more recently, long- distance 
bus operators. These are the operators that ultimately threaten the business 
model of the railway sector as a whole (except perhaps for mass transit). 
Regardless of what regulatory framework is put in place to guarantee non- 
discrimination and competition, and no matter how independent and well- 
coordinated the regulators, the fact is that the main problem – that is, the 
lack of profitability or even economic viability of rail – remains. Without 
clear public policies to support rail financially, railways will decline, no 
matter how well they are regulated. Regulation only comes into play once 
it has been decided where exactly – in the infrastructure or in transport, as 
well as for which category of transport – subsidies are given, so as to guar-
antee non- discrimination among the recipients of the subsidies.
In this sense, while it is good to focus on railway regulation, it is even 
better to focus on policies that do not discriminate in favour of rail against 
other transport modes.
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